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In 1976, legislation was enacted that substantially restricted the Inter-
nal Revenue Service's (IRS) power to issue John Doe summonses to investi-
gate unidentified persons.' Congress action reflected its concern about the
use of these summonses to conduct "fishing expeditions" through the records
of banks and other third parties in the hope of uncovering useful information
about someone. 2 The new law seeks to protect the privacy of such records by
permitting a John Doe summons to issue only after the IRS has satisfied a
district court, in an ex parte hearing, that there is a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that ascertainable persons may have violated the tax laws.
The new legislation and IRS interpretation of the statute have raised a
number of questions concerning the scope of the IRS authority to conduct
investigations or research projects not focused upon any particular taxpayer
or tax liability. One issue involves IRS attempts to circumvent the John Doe
summons requirements by requesting information about unidentified per-
sons while auditing an identified taxpayer. An administrative summons is
issued for documents relevant to the audited person's tax liability. 3 The IRS
does not follow the John Doe summons requirements even though the
records concern unidentified persons. The courts have disagreed about
whether administrative summonses with a dual purpose of investigating
both the audited person and an unidentified person are enforceable. Several
courts have ruled administrative summonses with a dual purpose are en-
forceable4 while one court has required the IRS to follow the John Doe sum-
mons requirements any time information is requested about unascertained
persons.
5
The IRS has also sought to avoid the John Doe summons procedures by
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. B.A., M.A., New York Uni-
versity; J.D., Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., Georgetown University.
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1205, 90 Stat. 1520, 1701 (codified at
I.R.C. § 7609(0 (1976)).
2. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 (1975) reprintedtn 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2897, 3207 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 658]; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 373 reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3439, 3802 [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. 938].
3. The general administrative summons is issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 7602 (1976). See
infra note 14 and accompanying text.
4. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 635 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Flagg,
634 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1980); United States v. Barter Sys., Inc., 82-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9698 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Constantinides, 80-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) $ 9830 (D.C. Md. 1980). See infta notes 64-66 and 73-86 and accompanying text.
5. United States v. Gottlieb, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9257 (M.D. Fla. 1982). See infra
notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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relying upon a statutory right to inspect records that taxpayers and other
third parties are required to maintain.6 The IRS has asserted that the in-
spection authority is implicit in the statutes that mandate recordkeeping.7
Such warrantless inspections, however, may raise serious constitutional issues
in light of Supreme Court decisions involving administrative searches. 8
Another controversy focuses on the reasonable basis standard for issuing
and enforcing a John Doe summons. The courts have disagreed as to what
the IRS must show to establish a reasonable basis for its belief that the tax-
payer has not complied with the tax laws. Some courts have concluded this
belief may be based upon IRS audit experience and statistical analyses, 9
while one court has required evidence about the specific unidentified person
or transaction.10 Courts have also disagreed about whether the expare judi-
cial determination authorizing issuance of a John Doe summons may be
challenged in a subsequent adversarial enforcement proceeding.'1
A final area of concern is the possible "chilling effect" an IRS summ-
mons may have upon the exercise of first amendment freedoms. It has been
asserted that a summons for documents identifying members of controversial
groups has an impermissible impact upon the members' freedom of associa-
tion.1 2  Similarly, summonses for records of religious organizations have
been challenged as infringing upon the members' right to exercise their reli-
gious beliefs.' 3 The courts in each of these cases have attempted to create
standards that will protect the interests of both the IRS and the taxpayers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Administrative Summonses in General
The basic investigatory tool of the IRS is the administrative summons
authorized by I.R.C. Section 7602.14 The statute grants the IRS broad pow-
6. This claim is based upon I.R.C. § 6001 (Supp. V 1981) and the regulations promul-
gated thereunder.
7. United States v. Mobil Corp., 543 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1981); United States v.
Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 475 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ohio 1978). See infra notes 87-108 and accompany-
ing text.
8. Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). Se also United States v. Mobil Corp., 543 F. Supp.
507, 517-19 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
9. United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Island Trade Exch., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). See ina notes 120-28 and
accompanying text.
10. United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982). See infra notes
129-44 and accompanying text.
11. United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 713 (1983); United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir.
1981); In re John Does, Dairy Cattle Prog., 541 F. Supp. 213 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v.
Island Trade Exch., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). See infra notes 146-69 and accom-
panying text.
12. United States v. Citizens State Bank, 612 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1980). See infia notes 170-
78.
13. United States v. Grayson County State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dented,
455 U.S. 1920 (1982); United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980). See infra notes 179-
86.
14. I.R.C. § 7602 (1976) provides:
Examination ofbooks and witness
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ers to require persons to produce information relevant to the determination
or collection of federal taxes. In United Slates v. Powell15 the Supreme Court
analogized the IRS summons to a grand jury subpoena,16 and held that the
government need make no showing of probable cause to obtain enforcement
of a summons.' 7 A subpoena may be issued, therefore, based on suspicion
that the laws have been violated, or merely to ascertain that the law is being
obeyed. 18
Although issued by an IRS agent, an administrative summons is en-
forced only through an order of a federal district court.19 This enforcement
proceeding provides for an impartial judicial officer to determine whether
the summons meets all statutory and constitutional requirements. In Powell,
the Supreme Court held that a summons will be enforced if: 1) the investi-
gation has a legitimate purpose, 2) the information sought is relevant to the
purpose, 3) the IRS does not already possess the information, and 4) the
summons procedural requirements have been followed.
20
The Powell decision maintained that a taxpayer may challenge a sum-
mons on "any appropriate ground."'2' Prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1976,22 however, taxpayers had little opportunity to challenge a summons
served on a third party seeking information about their affairs. In many
instances, the third parties (such as banks and credit-card issuers) voluntarily
complied with the summons, thereby eliminating the judicial enforcement
proceeding. 23 The IRS was not required to notify taxpayers that informa-
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in
respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is
authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or
any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody,
or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the per-
son liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in
the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to
give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
15. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
16. Id. at 57.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 57-58.
19. I.R.C. § 7402(b) (1976) provides:
To Enforce Summons-
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to
produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the
district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by appro-
priate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers,
or other data.
20. 379 U.S. at 57-58.
21. Id. at 58 (citing Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964)).
22. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1699 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
23. See generally Kenderdine, The Internal Revenue Service Summons to Produce Documents.- Powers,
Procedures, and Taxpayer Defenses, 64 MINN. L. REv. 73 (1977); Note, Taxation.- IRS Use ofJohn Doe
Adminitrative Summonses, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 465 (1977); Comment, Government Access to Bank
1983]
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tion concerning their affairs was being requested from a third party. Even if
the taxpayer was aware of the summons, he could not be assured that the
third party would assert any defenses in his absence. Moreover, if the sum-
moned third party refused to comply, the taxpayer had no absolute right to
intervene in the enforcement proceeding to present his case.
2 4
Congress provided a partial remedy in 1976 by creating special proce-
dures for the issuance of third-party summonses. Section 7609(a)(1) requires
the IRS to notify a taxpayer whenever a summons concerning his affairs is
served upon a statutorily defined third-party recordkeeper. 25 If the taxpayer
challenges the summons, the IRS must seek an enforcement order in the
district court. 26 The taxpayer now has an absolute right to intervene in the
enforcement proceeding and he may raise any appropriate defense.
27
B. The John Doe Summons
Obviously, if the taxpayer's identity is not known, the rights to notice of
the summons and to intervene in the enforcement proceeding provide no
practical protection. In these situations I.R.C. section 7609(f) provides judi-
cial supervision for IRS use of the John Doe summons by requiring a district
court proceeding before the summons is issued.2 8 In that proceeding, the IRS
must establish that: 1) the summons relates to an investigation of particular
Records in the Aftermath of United States v. Miller and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 14 Hous. L.
REV. 636 (1977).
24. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 527-30 (1971) (taxpayer may not intervene
in third-party summons enforcement proceeding merely because his tax liability is the subject of
the summons).
25. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3) (West Supp. 1983).
Third-parry recordkeeper defined.
For purposes of this subsection, the term "third-party recordkeeper" means-
(A) any mutual savings bank, cooperative bank, domestic building and
loan association, or other savings institution chartered and supervised as a savings
and loan or similar association under Federal or State law, any bank (as defined
in section 581), or any credit union (within the meaning of section 501(c)(14)(A));
(B) any consumer reporting agency (as defined under section 603(d) of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a(f));
(C) any person extending credit through the use of credit cards or similar
devices;
(D) any broker (as defined in section 3(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(4)));
(E) any attorney;
(F) any accountant; and
(G) any barter exchange (as defined in section 6045(c)(3)).
26. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (Act), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), made some changes in this area. Prior to
this Act, a taxpayer could stay compliance of the summons by notifying the third party. The
new statute requires the taxpayer to file a petition to quash the summons in the appropriate
district court within 20 days after receiving notice of the summons. Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, § 33 1(a), (b) (codified at I.R.C. § 7609(b)(2), (d) (West Supp. 1983).
27. I.R.C. § 7609(b)(1) (West.Supp. 1983).
28. I.R.C. § 7609(0 (West Supp. 1983).
Additional requirement in the case of aJohn Doe summons.-
Any summons described in subsection (c) which does not identify the person with
respect to whose liability the summons is issued may be served only after a court pro-
ceeding in which the Secretary establishes that-
(1) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascer-
tainable group or class of persons,
(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or
IRS INVESTIGATIONS
persons; 2) there is a reasonable basis for believing the person being investi-
gated has not complied with the tax laws; and 3) the information sought is
not readily available from other sources.
2 9
The John Doe summons requirements provide greater taxpayer protec-
tion than the general administrative summons requirements. One major dif-
ference is the John Doe summons requirement that the IRS must establish a
reasonable basis for believing that the unidentified taxpayer has not com-
plied with the tax laws. 30 This limitation on the traditionally broad investi-
gatory power of the IRS questions the validity of the Supreme Court's
analogy in Powell between an IRS summons and a grand jury subpoena.
3 '
A second important difference is that the restrictions of section 7609(0 apply
to the issuance of all John Doe summonses, whereas the notice requirements
of section 7609(a) are only applicable when a summons is served on a third-
party recordkeeper.
32
The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 197633 suggests section
7609(0 was enacted in response to a congressional belief that the IRS might
abuse the summons power in the case of unidentified taxpayers.3 4 The legis-
lation appears to have been prompted by the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Biscegha .35 Several commentators suggested Biscegla allowed
the IRS to use a John Doe summons as a "license to fish" through third-
party records. 36 Although the committee reports do not indicate an intent
to overrule any particular decision, it is clear Congress was not satisfied that
the privacy interests of taxpayers were properly safeguarded.
37
In Biscegha, the IRS was attempting to learn the identity of a person
who had deposited $20,000 in "paper thin, severely disintegrated" $100 bills
class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of any
internal revenue law, and
(3) the information sought to be obtained from the examination of the
records (and the identity of the person or persons with respect to whose liability
the summons is issued) is not readily available from other sources.
29. Id.
30. I.R.C. § 7609(l)(2).
31. 379 U.S. at 57. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1699 (1976).
34. The House Ways and Means Committee explained its rationale for changing the law
relating to administrative summonses as follows:
The Service has instituted an administrative policy designed to establish certain safe-
guards in this area. Under this policy, IRS representatives are instructed to obtain
information from taxpayers and third parties on a voluntary basis where possible.
Where a third party summons is served, advanced supervisory approval is required.
In the case of a John Doe summons, the advance supervisory approval must be ob-
tained on a high level basis. The committee believes, however, that these administra-
tive changes, while commendable, do not fully provide all of the safeguards which
might be desirable in terms of protecting the right of privacy.
H.R. REP. 658, supra note 2, at 307; S. REP. 938, supra note 2, at 368.
35. 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
36. See Note, The IRS Gets Its Fishing License-United States v. Bisceglia, 11 GONZ. L. REV.
251 (1976) [hereinafter cited as IRS Gets Fishing License]; Note, Federal Tax Procedure-An Extension
of the Summons Authority ofthe Internal Revenue Service, 21 Loy. L. REV. 1026 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Extension of Summons]; Note, IRS Subpoena Power to Investigate Unknown Taxpayers, 50
N.Y.U. L. REV. 177 (1976) [hereinafter cited as IRS Subpoena Power].
37. H.R. REP. 658, supra note 2, at 307; S. REP. 938, supra note 2, at 373.
1983]
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at a bank. 38 An IRS agent, suspecting unpaid taxes, issued a John Doe sum-
mons to the bank requesting all its records for the time period during which
the deposits were made. The bank refused to comply and the IRS obtained
an enforcement order from the district court. 39 The Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that the section 7602 summons power requires the IRS to identify
the person it wishes to investigate.
40
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, disagreed with this con-
clusion, emphasizing the practical necessities of the tax collection business.
"[I]t would be naive," the Chief Justice maintained, "to ignore the reality
that some persons attempt to outwit the system, and tax evaders are not
readily identifiable."''4 The opinion suggests that the IRS summons power
must be viewed against such a realistic background.
The Court stressed that sections 7601 and 7602 authorize the IRS to
investigate all persons who may be liable for any tax and to summon any
persons with respect to any tax liability.42 To read these statutes in a restric-
tive fashion would ignore the fact the IRS "has a legitimate interest in large
or unusual financial transactions, especially those involving cash." ' 4 3 It
would be impractical to investigate such transactions if the IRS was required
to ascertain the identities of the persons involved. Such a requirement
would frustrate the broad power of inquiry authorized by Congress in sec-
tion 7601.44
Chief Justice Burger's opinion rejected the contention that the Court
was permitting the IRS to carry on "fishing expeditions into the private af-
fairs of bank depositors."'4 5 Because the IRS must enforce a summons
through the courts, 46 taxpayers will be protected from improper searches.
The Court did not, however, address the practical question of who would
challenge a John Doe summons, given that the summoned third party has
little at stake.
A second decision, UnziedStates v. Humble Oil &RefMng Co. ,47 apparently
convinced Congress that the IRS might. engage in "fishing expeditions."
The issue in Humble Oil was the enforceability of a John Doe summons issued
in connection with an IRS research project concerning the extent of tax
avoidance among mineral property lessors. The summons requested the
names of all mineral lessors who held leases that were surrendered by Hum-
ble Oil without production. 48 The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the sum-
mons and held the section 7602 summons authority extended only to
investigations of specific individuals. The summons power could not be used
38. 420 U.S. at 142-43.
39. United States v. Bisceglia, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9474 (D.C. Ky. 1972).
40. Bisceglia v. United States,.486 F.2d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 1973).
41. 420 U.S. at 145.
42. Id. at 149.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 150.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 151.
47. 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974),acated and remanded, 421 U.S. 943, afdper curtam, 518 F.2d
747 (5th Cir. 1975).
48. 488 F.2d at 954.
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to conduct general research projects.
49
The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of the holding in Biscegha.
5° On re-
mand, the Fifth Circuit again concluded the summons was unenforceable. 5'
The court distinguished Biscegl'a as involving an ongoing particularized in-
vestigation which presented facts indicating tax evasion. 52 In contrast, Hum-
ble Oil involved a research project that might reveal liability for unpaid
taxes only as a result of an IRS fishing expedition.
53
Justices Blackmun and Powell in their concurring opinion in Biscegla
observed that a John Doe summons may be used to learn the identity of a
particular person whose transactions "strongly suggest liability for unpaid
taxes." 54 The Fifth Circuit's holding in Humble Oil is in agreement with this
interpretation.5 5 If this more limited view of the summons power had been
generally accepted, it is doubtful Congress would have enacted section
7609(o. The legislative history of section 7609 indicated, however, that Con-
gress feared Bisceglia allowed the IRS to roam at will through third-party
records in order to discover liability for unpaid taxes.
56
III. WHEN MUST THE JOHN DOE SUMMONS BE USED
A. The Dual Purpose Summons
Many of the questions about John Doe summonses have arisen in con-
nection with the burgeoning phenomenon of barter exchanges. These enti-
ties operate as clearinghouses for exchanges of goods and services between
exchange members. Each member is credited with units in proportion to the
dollar value of the goods and services he provides. These units are then
traded for goods and services contributed by other exchange members.
57
With few exceptions, 58 an exchange of property is a taxable event which
is to be reported as income by each party to the exchange. The amount of
reportable income equals the difference between the value of the property
received and the adjusted basis of the property contributed. In the barter
exchange context, the IRS views the taxable event as occurring when the
member's account is credited with units having an ascertainable market
value.59 IRS experience indicated exchange members frequently failed to
report income from barter exchange transactions.
6 °
49. 488 F.2d at 962-63.
50. 421 U.S. 943 (1975).
51. 518 F.2d at 748-49.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 420 U.S. at 151 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
55. 518 F.2d at 748-49.
56. H.R. REP. 658, supra note 2, at 307; S. REP. 938, supra note 2, at 373. See generally IRS
Gets Fishing License, supra note 36; Extension of Swnmons, supra note 36; IRS Subpoena Power, supra
note 36.
57. United States v. Barter Sys., Inc., 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9127 (D. Neb. 1981).
58. Nonrecognition or deferral of gain realized from a property exchange is provided for
certain exchanges of "like-kind" property by I.R.C. § 1031 (1976).
59. Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100.
60. Congress responded to the increasing use of barter exchanges as tax avoidance devices
in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
19831
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The IRS sought to discourage the use of barter exchanges as a tax
avoidance device by selecting a high proportion of exchange members for
audit.6 1 To identify exchange members, the IRS summoned membership
lists in the course of exchange audits. These summonses have been resisted
on the grounds that the IRS is seeking information about unidentified tax-
payers without following the John Doe summons requirements 62 or that the
information is for a general research project and therefore contrary to the
Humble Ol ban on general research summonses.
63
In United States v. Constantinides,64 a district court enforced a summons
for a barter exchange's membership list even though the IRS clearly in-
tended to use the information in connection with a research project. The
summons was enforced because the information requested was relevant to a
determination of the exchange's tax liability. 65 The summons was not inva-
lid merely because it might also be useful for an IRS research project. 66
Not all courts agree with the Constantimides rationale. In United States v.
Gotthieb ,67 the court held the IRS must follow John Doe summons procedures
whenever they request information about unidentified taxpayers from a
third party.68 The court reasoned that if the IRS could obtain information
about unidentified taxpayers while auditing a third party, they would never
have to use the John Doe summons procedures.
69
A Nebraska district court, in United States v. Barter Systems, Inc. ,70 fol-
lowed a rationale similar to Gottlieb in concluding that section 7609(0 was
intended to make a firm distinction between investigations of identified and
unidentified persons. The opinion indicates section 7609(0 was intended by
Congress to be a limitation on the broad investigative powers of the IRS. 7 1
Therefore, a summons issued in the course of an audit must comply with the
special John Doe provisions if the IRS intends to use the information for the
primary purpose of investigating unknown persons.7
2
The Eighth Circuit reversed, maintaining that the lower court had con-
strued the scope of the IRS summons power too narrowly. 73 The court indi-
cated the IRS summons authority should be upheld unless it was expressly
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). This Act amended I.R.C. § 6045 (West Supp.
1983), making barter exchanges subject to transaction reporting requirements. The Act also
amended I.R.C. § 7609(a) (West Supp. 1983) to classify a barter exchange as a third-party
recordkeeper.
61. United States v. Constantinides, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9830 at 85,733 (D. Md.
1980).
62. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
64. 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9830 (D. Md. 1980).
65. Id. at 85,734.
66. Id. at 85,735.
67. 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)" ,9257 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
68. Id. at 83,561.
69. Id. Contra United States v. Bart~r Sys., Inc., 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9707 (E.D.
Mich. 1982).
70. 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9127 (D.C. Neb. 1981), rev'd, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9698 (8th Cir. 1982).
71. 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 83,094.
72. d.




prohibited by statute or was contrary to substantial policy interests. The
court concluded that section 7609(o is not a limit on IRS use of a general
summons during an investigation of a named taxpayer even though the sum-
mons requires disclosure of information relating to unidentified taxpayers
whom the IRS might also wish to audit.
74
The IRS experience in enforcing summonses issued in connection with
its Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) also sheds light
on the dual purpose summons issue.75 The TCMP is a research project
designed to evaluate overall compliance with tax reporting requirements.
76
Several thousand taxpayers are selected randomly by computer for intensive
audits. The ultimate purpose of the TCMP is to increase the IRS efficiency
by concentrating enforcement efforts on specific problem areas.
77
In United States v. Flagg,78 the IRS sought enforcement of a summons
served on a taxpayer selected under the TCMP. Although the district court
refused to enforce the summons,7 9 the Eighth Circuit reversed, maintaining
the IRS summons power must be construed broadly to effectuate congres-
sional intent that the IRS insure compliance with the tax laws.80 The court
concluded that Humble Oil did not establish that tax records might never be
examined for research purposes; Humble Oil only held that a summons must
be issued pursuant to a "particularized investigat'n:i of an individual tax-
payer."' The TCMP satisfies this requirement because the summonses are
issued to determine a particular individual's tax liability.
Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit concurred in this interpretation of Hum-
ble Oil in United States o. First National Bank of Dallas , 8 2 which involved the
enforcement of a third-party summons issued to a bank, requesting records
pertaining to a taxpayer undergoing a TCMP audit.8 3 Relying on Humble
Oil, the district court refused to enforce the summons.8 4  On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit reversed and explained that Humble Oil did not hold that a
summons could not be enforced if issued primarily for research purposes. A
summons may be used to obtain information for research purposes if the
summons is issued to determine the tax liability of a specific taxpayer.
85
Thus, the Fifth Circuit stated that the rationale of Humble Oil is limited to
cases where a summons is issued solely to obtain research data.86
74. Id. at 85,519.
75. See generally Note, Enforcing Internal Revenue Service Summonses Under the Taxpayer Aleasure-
ment Compliance Program: The Needfor Statutory Reform, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 861 (1982).
76. [3 Audit] INTERNAL REV. MAN. (CCH) § 4861.1(2) (Aug. 27, 1980).
77. United States v. Flagg, 634 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1980).
78. Id.
79. 45 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 80-618, 80-621 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
80. 634 F.2d at 1091.
81. Id. at 1092. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
82. 635 F.2d 391 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981).
83. 635 F.2d at 392.
84. 468 F. Supp. 415 (N. D. Tex. 1979). See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
85. 635 F.2d at 395.
86. It should be noted that these TCMP cases are not controlling on the issue of whether a
dual purpose summons may be used to obtain information about unidentified persons. The
TCMP cases are concerned solely with whether the summons was issued for a proper purpose.
Issuance of a John Doe summons also requires a determination of whether § 7609(l) restrictions
19831
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B. The Right to "Inspect" Records
The IRS has attempted to avoid statutory and judicial restrictions on its
use of administrative summonses to conduct general research by asserting a
statutory right to inspect documents that taxpayers and third parties are
required to maintain.8 7 The IRS claims such records may be inspected
without issuing a summons. Two courts disagree as to whether there is an
absolute inspection right. One court, in United States v. Mobil Corp. ,88 held
that section 6001 did not imply authority to inspect. 8 9 Another court, in
United States v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. ,9 ruled that statutory authority to require
records implies an authority to inspect the records. 9 1
1. United States v. Mobil Corp. 92
In United States v. Mobil Corp. ,93 the IRS requested a permanent injunc-
tion to compel production of records which Mobil kept pursuant to section
6001. The information sought concerned the number of personal exemp-
tions claimed by Mobil's employees on their tax withholding forms and re-
flected the government's concern over the increasing use of unwarranted
exemption claims to reduce the amount of tax withheld from wages. The
IRS claimed that its right to inspect these records was implied from both the
language of section 6001,9' and its implementing regulations. 95
Mobil refused the request, contending that the section 6001 recordkeep-
ing provisions should not be utilized to compel a production of records that
could not be obtained by a summons.96 Mobil suspected that the IRS was
requesting the information in connection with a general research project, in
which case Humble Oil indicated that a summons would not be enforceable.
apply. See United States v. Barter Sys., Inc., 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9698 at 85,518 n.10
(E.D. Mich. 1982).
87. The basis for the claim of a statutory right to inspect is found in I.R.C. § 6001 (Supp.
V 1981) which provides:
Notice or regulations requz'ing records, statements and special returns
Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection thereof,
shall keep such records, render such statements, make such returns, and comply with
such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe. When-
ever in the judgment of the Secretary it is necessary, he may require any person, by
notice served upon such person or by regulations, to make such returns, render such
statements, or keep such records, as the Secretary deems sufficient to show whether or
not such person is liable for tax under this title. The only records which an employer
shall be required to keep under this section in connection with charged tips shall be
charge receipts, records necessary to comply with section 6053(c), and copies of state-
ments furnished by employees under section 6053(a).
88. 543 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. Tex. 1981).
89. Id.
90. 475 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
91. Id. at 700.
92. 543 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
93. Id. An earlier reported decision in this case by the same court considered Mobil's mo-
tion for discovery. 499 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
94. The IRS asserted its right to inspect was inherent in the language of section 6001 that
requires "maintenance" of records for tax liability.
95. 543 F. Supp. at 509. In Treas. Reg. § 31.6001-1(e)(1) (1960) the Secretary declared
"[aill records required by the regulations in this part shall be kept, by the person required to
keep them, at one or more convenient and safe locations accessible to internal revenue officers,
and shall at all times be available for inspection by such officers."
96. 543 F. Supp. at 508.
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Also, if no specific employees were under investigation, the IRS would have
to comply with the John Doe summons procedures.
9 7
Mobil sought to discover the purpose for the IRS inspection by serving
a subpoena duces tecum and requesting documents that would reveal the iden-
tities of any employees under investigation by the IRS. On an IRS motion
to quash the subpoena, Mobil argued that any inspection right conferred by
section 6001 is analogous to the summons power granted by section 7602.
Thus, it should enjoy all the statutory and procedural rights that would be
available in a summons enforcement proceeding.
The district court quashed the subpoena, holding that whatever result
would obtain in a summons enforcement proceeding is not dispositive with
respect to the scope of discovery under section 6001.98 A preliminary in-
quiry into the IRS purpose for an inspection is unnecessary with respect to
section 6001 because the inspection causes only a limited disruption and in-
trusion into the privacy of the inspected party. Conversely, section 7602 pro-
vides a far greater reach with respect to the parties, subject matter, and type
of testimony that may be summoned. It is this "sweeping and intrusive"
nature of the summons power that necessitates the judicial restrictions set
forth in Powell as well as the requirement that the summons be issued only
with respect to specific and well-defined investigations. The court concluded
in the discovery order that the government may demand an inspection of
records even though its purpose is to avoid statutory and judicial restrictions
on the issuance of a summons.
Judge Higginbotham. clearly had second thoughts about this discovery
order. In granting Mobil's motion for summary judgment, the court held
that the IRS derives no inspection authority from section 6001. In order to
compel an inspection, the IRS must issue a summons pursuant to section
7602. 99 The court did not find an implied right to inspect because to con-
strue section 6001 otherwise would raise serious constitutional questions.10 °
To avoid these constitutional difficulties, the court indicated the IRS was
obligated to construe section 6001 narrowly.1o
2. United States v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. 102
In contrast to the Mobil case, United States v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. pro-
vides judicial support for the IRS interpretation of its inspection authority.
Ohio Bell concerned an IRS investigation into the validity of excise tax ex-
emptions claimed by Ohio Bell customers. 103 Although the tax is paid by
the customer, it is collected and paid to the IRS by the telephone company.
97. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
98. 499 F. Supp. at 484.
99. 543 F. Supp. at 519. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
100. Id. at 511-16.
101. This construction process begins with an exhaustive analysis of the relevant legislative
history, which, the court concludes, presents no clear picture of congressional intent. Without
such guidance, the rules of construction mandate that the statute be construed in a manner that
avoids constitutional difficulties.
102. 475 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
103. Id. at 699.
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Certain organizations 10 4 could obtain exemptions from the tax by submit-
ting an exemption certificate and supporting documents to the telephone
company.' 0 5 The regulations require these certificates to be made available
for inspection. 106
In the course of its investigation of Ohio Bell subscribers, the IRS re-
quested access to the exemption certificates and documents. Ohio Bell re-
fused to comply with the request. In an action instituted by the IRS to
compel production of the documents, Ohio Bell maintained that the IRS
must first issue a summons and comply with the John Doe notice provi-
sions. 10 7 The court rejected this contention and found that section 6001 au-
thority to require recordkeeping implied a grant of authority to inspect the
records without issuing a summons. 108
3. The Fourth Amendment Issue
The constitutional problem perceived by the Mobil court stems from the
Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 109 In. Barlow's the
Court declared the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)"10
unconstitutional to the extent it authorized the Secretary of Labor to con-
duct nonconsensual, warrantless, administrative inspections of business work
areas. As in Mobil, the inspection in Barlow's was not initiated in response to
a specific complaint, but was the result of OSHA's routine compliance selec-
tion process.
The Court held that a warrant, or its equivalent, must be obtained
before nonconsensual searches are conducted. This procedure insures that
"the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by stat-
ute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral
criteria.""' The warrant requirement also serves to advise the owner of the
104. I.R.C. § 4253 (1976).
105. 26 C.F.R. § 49.4253-11 (1982).
106. 26 C.F.R. § 148.1-4(g) (1982).
107. 475 F. Supp. at 699. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 700. The Mobil court rejected this rationale because it found no language in
§ 6001 to support the conclusion that the statute grants "implicit authority" to inspect records.
The requirement that records be available for inspection does not necessarily allow them to be
inspected without the protections provided by summons enforcement procedures. Thus, the
IRS regulations go beyond the authority granted by the statute. See 543 F. Supp. at 511.
109. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). The constitutional questions raised by warrantless administrative
searches of business and residential areas have been discussed in a number of excellent articles.
See generally McManis & McManis, Structuring Admiistrative Inspections: Is There Any Warrant For A
Search Warrant?, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 942 (1977); Note, Administrative Searches and the Implied Consent
Doctrine: Beyond the Fourth Amendment, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 91 (1976); Note, Camara, See and
Their Progeny: Another Look at Administrative Inspections Under the Fourth Amendment, 15 COLUM. J. L.
& Soc. PROBs. 61 (1979); Note, Rationalzing Administrative Searches, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1291
(1979); Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MINN. L. REv. 155 (1967).
110. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 and Supp. V
1981). The statute provides that an employer must "make, keep and preserve, and make avail-
able" to the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare such records
as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe by regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(1) (1976).
The regulations issued pursuant to this authority authorize inspectors to "review records
required by the Act . ..and other records which are directly related to the purpose of the
inspection." 29 C.F.R. § 1903.3 (1982).
111. 436 U.S. at 323. In discussing the Secretary's contention that requiring warrants seri-
ously burdens the enforcement process, the Court noted that warrants for administrative
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premises of the "scope andobjects of the search, beyond which limits the




In Mobil, the court indicated that the undefined scope of the warrantless
inspection authority claimed by the IRS created constitutional problems
similar to those presented in Barlow's. 113 The court noted that the IRS inter-
pretation of section 6001 would allow it to "unilaterally determine the scope
of its inspection rights." ' 1 4 The court interpreted Barlow's as rejecting such
broad administrative latitude and requiring judicial supervision over agency
record inspections. 1 15
The court's conclusion in Mobil that this judicial supervision necessitates
the issuance of a summons is, however, questionable. The Barlow's require-
ment of review by a neutral officer is satisfied by a "warrant or its
equivalent." ' 6 The Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Mississippi
Power & Light Co. 117 suggests the IRS procedures for enforcing record in-
spections may provide a warrant equivalent. The court in Mssi'ssippi" Power
ruled that Department of Labor procedures providing resort to a federal
court prior to the inspection are the type of warrant equivalent contem-
plated by the Court in Barlow's.I"'
The court interpreted the Barlow's warrant equivalent standard as man-
dating judicial review of an inspection request before an inspection.11 9 Under
this view, requiring the IRS to obtain an injunction to enforce its inspection
right provides adequate constitutional protection because a court will deter-
mine the reasonableness of the search before it is conducted. 120
searches do not require probable cause in the criminal law sense, but instead require only that
reasonable legislative and administrative standards be followed in selecting an establishment for
inspection. This category of "administrative" probable cause was created by the Court in the
companion cases of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) and See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967). The less demanding standard recognized that effective regulatory pro-
grams often require the deterrent effect of unannounced, random inspections. An administra-
tive warrant only requires a showing that "a valid public interest justifies the intrusion."
Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
In later cases, the Court held that a warrant need not be obtained in all circumstances. In
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) and United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972), the Court concluded that valid warrantless searches could be conducted
with respect to industries that historically have been pervasively regulated and which require
frequent, unannounced inspections for effective law enforcement. Thus, persons in industries
such as those involving firearms or liquor are deemed to have impliedly consented to the inspec-
tions. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316; Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 74-77. The Barlow's decision indicates this
"implied consent" doctrine will not be extended to permit warrantless inspections merely be-
cause an industry engages in interstate commerce or is subject to governmental regulation.
112. 436 U.S. at 323.
113. 543 F. Supp. at 518-19.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 436 U.S. at 325.
117. 638 F.2d 899 (5th Cir.), cer. dened, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
118. 638 F.2d at 907.
119. Id.
120. The inquiry into the reasonableness of a particular search is held to require considera-
tion of three elements. Id. at 907. The first is whether there is statutory authority for the pro-
posed search. The second is whether the scope of the search is properly limited. The third
element requires an examination of whether the standards used by the agency in choosing to
initiate a particular search satisfy the fourth amendment standards of reasonableness. The deci-
sion must be based upon evidence of an existing violation, upon reasonable legislative or admin-
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IV. ISSUING AND ENFORCING JOHN DOE SUMMONSES
A. Reasonable Basis
IRS reluctance to use section 7609(f) procedures reflects its uncertainty
about its ability to demonstrate a reasonable basis for believing someone has
not complied with the tax laws. 12 1 In most instances where John Doe sum-
monses have been sought, the IRS has asserted two bases for meeting this
statutory requirement. The first is that the transaction involved is inherently
suspicious as susceptible to tax cheating.122 The second is that examinations
of taxpayers in similar situations indicate a high degree of improper
reporting. 1
23
Most courts have agreed that either of these circumstances alone can
provide the reasonable basis required for issuing a John Doe summons. For
example, in United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exchange, Inc. ,124 the Third Circuit
upheld a summons demanding production of a barter exchange's member-
ship list and bartering transaction records. 125 The holding was supported
principally by a revenue agent's testimony that barter transactions "are in-
herently susceptible to tax error."' 126 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that
the fact members of barter exchanges "historically, exhibited numerous er-
rors in the reporting of non-cash transactions" constituted a reasonable basis
for investigating members of a particular exchange. 127 In United States v.
Island Trade Exchange, Inc. ,128 the court allowed issuance of a John Doe sum-
mons because the IRS met the rational basis standard by establishing that
the "unique and nontraditional features of bartering transactions cause tax-
payers to omit or improperly report income."'
29
Evaluation of whether the IRS belief in a particular case is reasonable is
quite subjective as was illustrated in United States v. Brigham Young Univer-
sity.' 30 In that case, the IRS asserted a reasonable basis derived from its
audit experience with 162 returns of property donors to the university.'
3 1
Every one of the returns revealed substantial overvaluations of the contrib-
uted property. Because the vast majority of these overvaluations involved
contributions of art objects or silver mining claims arranged by particular
dealers or appraisers, Brigham Young University (BYU) offered to identify
the donors of such property. The IRS refused this offer and obtained an ex
istrative standards, or, the search must be made "pursuant to an administrative plan containing
specific neutral criteria." Id. at 907 (quoting Bar/ow's, 436 U.S. at 323).
121. I.R.C. § 7609(0(2) (West Supp. 1983). See supra note 13.
122. United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Island Trade Exch., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
123. United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), cert granted, 103
S. Ct. 713 (1983); United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Maxwell, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9378 (D. Nev. 1981).
124. 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981).
125. Id. at 308.
126. Id. at 306.
127. In re John Does, 671 F.2d 977, 980 (6th Cir. 1982).
128. 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
129. Id. at 997.
130. 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), revkg, 485 F. Supp. 534 (D. Utah 1980),cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 713 (1983).
131. 485 F. Supp. at 536.
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pare order allowing it to serve a John Doe summons for the names of all
persons who donated property.
132
In the subsequent enforcement proceeding, the court refused to enforce
the summons. The fact that many BYU donors overvalued their gifts did
not provide a reasonable basis for believing other donors had overvalued
their gifts. 133 The court was not persuaded by the IRS statistical argument
that the large number of improper deductions discovered made it likely that
other donors had also overstated the value of their contributions. 1
34
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's interpretation
of the reasonable basis standard.' 3 5 The court compared this case to the
cases of Columbus Trade Exchange 136 and Pittsburgh Trade Exchange,' 37 where
the IRS statistical experience had been with members of other barter ex-
changes. Supported by these cases in two other circuits, the court concluded
that the fact each of the 162 donors examined had overvalued their gifts
made it reasonable to believe at least some of the remaining 150 donors had
overvalued their gifts.
138
One issue not explored in Brigham Young Unwterst'y is the validity of the
statistical evidence upon which the IRS established its reasonable basis. It
must be noted that all the determinations about the overvalued contribu-
tions were made by the IRS. 139 It is possible that a number of the findings
were incorrect and certainly all were subject to challenge in the administra-
tive appeals process or in the courts.
This statistical question was raised in United States v. Maxwell,'4° where
the IRS sought enforcement of a John Doe summons demanding the mem-
bership list of a Nevada barter exchange. To establish a reasonable basis for
the summons, the IRS presented the results of two annual surveys of the
audits of members of a large Los Angeles barter exchange.'41 The 1976 sur-
vey indicated fifty-nine percent of the active members failed to report any
income from their barter transactions, while the 1977 survey showed sev-
enty-two percent failed to report. The IRS also asserted that statements
made by the exchange's proprietor, to the effect that he knew members were
not reporting income, established a second reasonable basis for the
summons. 142
The court straddled the issue, somewhat, in holding that the IRS
surveys "may not . . . standing alone" be sufficient to establish a reasonable
basis. 143 The court noted "[tihe survey was not an independent study by
unbiased researchers," and observed that "the results of any study are only
132. Id. at 535.
133. Id. at 538.
134. Id.
135. 679 F.2d at 1349.
136. 671 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1982).
137. 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981).
138. 679 F.2d at 1350.
139. 485 F. Supp. at 536.
140. 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9378 (D. Nev. 1981).
141. Id. at 87,026-27.
142. Id. at 87,025-26.
143. Id. at 87,029.
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as reliable as the methodology employed. ' 144 The summons was, however,
enforceable because the survey results together with the proprietor's state-
ments established the requisite reasonable basis..'
45
B. Challenging the John Doe Summons
A fundamental question about section 7609()146 is whether it created
new substantive limitations on the IRS summons power or whether it merely
provided additional procedural requirements. Congress directed the district
courts to authorize the service of a John Doe summons in an exparte proceed-
ing based "solely upon the [IRS] petition and supporting affidavits.'
1 47
This language has been interpreted to allow the summoned party to chal-
lenge the enforcement of a summons by attacking the sufficiency of the IRS
showing with respect to issuance of the summons. ' 48 The effect of this inter-
pretation is to make a sharp distinction between the enforcement standards
for John Doe and other administrative summonses. Some courts, however,
have maintained that Congress did not intend to create such a distinction,
precluding later challenges to the ex parte findings. 1
49
The disagreement on this issue results from different analyses of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Powell. 150 If Powell is interpreted as being pri-
marily concerned about IRS abuse of its summons powers, then the grounds
for challenging enforcement of a summons should be quite broad. In con-
trast, if Powell is viewed as rejecting any probable cause requirement for
enforcement of an IRS summons, a taxpayer may not challenge the ex pare
reasonable basis findings in a subsequent proceeding to enforce the sum-
mons. Using this more restrictive interpretation, section 7609() only pro-
vides a new procedure to restrain IRS use of John Doe summonses; under this
approach no new substantive ground for challenging a summons has been
created.
The practical effect of allowing a summoned party to challenge the issu-
ance of a John Doe summons at an enforcement proceeding is to convert the
ex parte inquiry into an adversarial contest. In Brigham Young Unvers'y,'
1 5 1
the Tenth Circuit indicated the Supreme Court mandated such a contest.1
52
The court quoted Reisman v. Caplin ' 53 as authority for its contention that a
summons enforcement proceeding is an adversarial determination of the is-
sues wherein a "witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate
144. Id. at 87,028.
145. Id. at 87,029.
146. See supra note 25.
147. I.R.C. § 7609(h)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
148. United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 713 (1983); United States v. Island Trade Exch., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y.
1982).
149. Agricultural Asset Management Co. v. United States, 688 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981); In re John Does, 541
F. Supp. 213 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
150. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
151. 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982).
152. Id. at 1348.
153. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
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ground."' 154 Powell is cited as authorizing the courts to "inquire into the
underlying reasons" for an IRS investigation.1 55 A similar rationale was
adopted by one New York district court in United States v. Island Trade Ex-
change, Inc. 156 The court in Island Trade Exchange viewed section 7609(0 as
encompassed by the requirements in Powell that a summons meet all the
administrative provisions of the Code.
157
In reJohn Does 158 heard by a second New York district court, rejected
the view that the ex parte findings could be challenged in the summons en-
forcement proceedings.' 59 The court noted that permitting a redetermina-
tion of the ex parte hearing issues would render the ex parte proceeding
unnecessary and would interfere with IRS investigatory powers. 
60
The Second Circuit resolved this difference of opinion by holding that
the section 7609(o criteria are not appropriate grounds for challenging en-
forcement of a summons.1 61 An analysis of the statute's legislative history
persuaded the court that Congress did not intend for questions about the
issuance of summonses to become entangled in adversarial proceedings.'
62
To hold otherwise "would make the ex parte proceeding superfluous," a re-
sult Congress can hardly have intended.'
63
In Pittsburgh Trade Exchange, 164 the Third Circuit also stated that the
section 7609(0 criteria cannot serve as an additional substantive basis for
challenging summons enforcement.' 65 The court's opinion, however, was
based on a different and more questionable analysis of the statute's legisla-
tive history. This opinion noted that a major portion of section 7609 is con-
cerned with providing notice to taxpayers when summonses regarding their
affairs are served upon third parties. From this, the court concluded the
thrust of section 7609(f) is to provide procedural safeguards for unidentified
taxpayers who cannot be notified.' 66 Because the ex parte proceeding is es-
sentially a substitute for notice, the criteria used in the ex parte proceeding
were not intended to create substantive defenses to summons
enforcement.'
6 7
While the court's conclusion may be valid, the legislative history does
not support the view that section 7609(f is primarily concerned with the
problem of notice.168 The placement of this subsection among the general
154. 679 F.2d at 1348 (quoting Reuman, 375 U.S. at 449).
155. 679 F.2d at 1348 (quoting Powell, 379 U.S. at 58).
156. 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
157. Id. at 996.
158. 541 F. Supp. 213 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
159. Id. at 218.
160. Id. at 218-19. This reasoning echos that of Powell. The Court rejected the probable
cause requirement for IRS summonses "because it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in
carrying out investigations he thinks warranted, forcing him to litigate and prosecute appeals on
the very subject which he desires to investigate .. " 379 U.S. at 54.
161. Agricultural Asset Management Co. v. United States, 688 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1982).
162. Id. at 149.
163. Id.
164. 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981).
165. Id. at 306.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. H.R. REP. 658, supra note 2, at 307; S. REP. 938, supra note 2, at 368.
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third-party recordkeeping provisions appears to be more a matter of conven-
ience than affinity. The Committee Reports clearly indicate that section
7609(f) is directed at curbing potential IRS abuse of John Doe
summonses. 
169
It is equally clear Congress did not intend to establish a new basis for
resisting enforcement of summonses. Congress understood the importance of
the John Doe summons as an investigatory tool and did not intend John Doe
summons provisions to impose an excessive burden on the IRS.' 70 By man-
dating an ex parte proceeding, Congress apparently recognized that permit-
ting an adversarial contest on the reasonable basis question would inhibit
the use of John Doe summonses.
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
The possibility that the government may learn the names of members of
controversial political, religious, or similar organizations inhibits participa-
tion by some people who might otherwise join or support these groups. In
light of this reality, the courts have recognized that the constitutional right
to freedom of association depends in great measure upon an ancillary right
to privacy in one's associations.' 7 t Thus, an investigation that would in-
fringe upon associational privacy is permissible only where the government
can demonstrate a substantial relationship between the information re-
quested and a compelling state interest.1
7 2
An illustration of how this constitutional protection may limit the IRS
summons power is presented in United States v. Citizens State Bank ,173 where an
organization of tax protestors, the United States Taxpayers Union (USTU),
sought to prevent the IRS from summoning bank records that could reveal
the identities of its members and contributors.' 7 4 The summons was issued
to a bank during an investigation of a USTU officer who had not filed an
income tax return for ten years. The IRS requested all bank records for the
officer's personal account and for a USTU account controlled by the officer.
The bank did not comply with the summons. In an IRS action to enforce
the summons, the officer and the USTU intervened alleging that release of
the records would identify members and contributors of the organization.
The intervenors claimed that giving the IRS access to USTU records would
discourage persons from joining or contributing to the organization out of
169. Id.
170. H.R. REP. 658, supra note 2, at 306; S. REP. 938, supra note 2, at 373.
171. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (committee
request for NAACP membership lists in connection with investigation of Communist Party de-
nied because state did not demonstrate a substantial relation between the information sought
and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (state request for NAACP membership lists denied because state could not justify the
infringement on right of freedom of association); Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D.
Ark.), affdper curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968) (no compelling government interest shown for sub-
poena requiring production of records identifying contributors to Republican Party). But see
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (Army Intelligence system for surveillance of lawful political
activity did not, by itself, have a chilling effect upon constitutional freedoms).
172. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
173. 612 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1980).
174. Id. at 1093.
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fear of IRS retaliation.' 75 To support this contention, the USTU sought to
introduce evidence on the adverse effects such an IRS summons would have
on its activities. The district court, however, deemed this evidence irrelevant
and enforced the summons. '
76
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that aprimafacie
showing of a first amendment infringement required the IRS to establish an
appropriate need for the material.177 The IRS must demonstrate that there
is a rational connection between disclosure of the information and a legiti-
mate and compelling government interest."18 On remand the district court
was ordered to determine whether disclosure of the bank records would ad-
versely affect USTU's freedom of association and, if so, whether the govern-
ment had a compelling need for the information. The court emphasized,
however, that its decision would "only rarely serve to limit the reach of an
IRS summons."" 79
Just how rare is illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States
v. Holmes,' 80 involving a summons issued during an investigation into the
exempt status of a church. Although the court found the summons too
broad to meet the restrictive statutory standard of I.R.C. section 7605(c),
which permitted examination of church records only to the extent neces-
sary,' 8 ' the likelihood of a subsequent narrower summons impelled the court
to consider the constitutional issue.' 8 2 The church asserted that any sum-
mons for documents relating to its internal affairs would infringe upon its
members' free exercise of religion.' 8 3  The court held, however, that al-
though the summons might create an incidental burden upon religious activ-
ities, this burden was balanced by the government's substantial interest in its
fiscal integrity. '
8 4
In the later case of United States v. Grayson County State Bank,'8 5 the same
court indicated that religious free exercise cases are distinguishable from the
essentially political situation presented in Citizens State Bank. The court con-
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1094.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. at 248).
179. Id.
180. 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curim).
181. I.R.C. § 7605(c) (1976) Restriction on Examination of Churches-
No examination of the books of account of a church or convention or association of
churches shall be made to determine whether such organization may be engaged in
the carrying on of an unrelated trade or business or may be otherwise engaged in
activities which may be subject to tax under part III of subchapter F of chapter 1 of
this title (sec. 511 and following, relating to taxation of business income of exempt
organizations) unless the Secretary (such officer being no lower than a principal inter-
nal revenue officer for an internal revenue region) believes that such organization may
be so engaged and so notifies the organization in advance of the examination. No
examination of the religious activities of such an organization shall be made except to
the extent necessary to determine whether such organization is a church or a conven-
tion or association of churches, and no examination of the books of account of such an
organization shall be made other than to the extent necessary to determine the
amount of tax imposed by this title.
182. 614 F.2d at 88-89.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 990.
185. 656 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982).
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cluded that allowing the IRS access to church records did not restrict reli-
gious freedom. 186 The court did not, however, discuss the potential chilling




The controversies surrounding the John Doe summons legislation indi-
cate that the statute has not protected taxpayer privacy interests, but rather
has created a tactic for delaying and hindering IRS investigations. This is
the result of a congressional failure to recognize the wisdom of the Supreme
Court's longstanding view that the IRS power to summon documents cannot
be narrowly construed if the tax laws are to be effectively administered.18 8
Section 7609(f) was enacted because Congress believed that the Bsceg-
ha'8 9 decision authorized IRS fishing expeditions and because it approved
of the holding in Humble Oi/.'9° Yet the rationale in Biscegh'a, is the better
reasoned view. The IRS can protect government revenues only by having
access to records of financial transactions. In most cases, access to records
will not violate legitimate privacy expectations because the records have
been voluntarily thrust into the stream of commerce.
For similar reasons, the IRS should be permitted to collect information
concerning potential tax evasion. This does not suggest the IRS should be
free to roam through records without purpose, but the IRS should be al-
lowed to accumulate information about specific types of transactions. Lim-
ited access to records required to be maintained would protect the IRS
interest in tax compliance. Given the judicial role in the injunction process,
the recordkeeper's fourth amendment rights would also be protected.
The issue of IRS summons infringements on first amendment rights has
not been fully developed. As the courts hear more of these cases, the scope of
IRS authority to summon records of churches and political organizations
will be defined.
186. 656 F.2d at 1074. In quoting from Holmes, the court noted that even if there is an
incidental burden on the free exercise of religion, the burden is justified if a compelling govern-
ment interest outweighs the degree of impairment. d.
187. The position of the Eighth Circuit on the issue of IRS summonses and religious free
exercise is not clear. In United States v. Life Science Church, 636 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980) (per
curkim) the court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether a sum-
mons for church records was too broad under § 7605(c). The court also ordered a determination
of the constitutional issues raised by Citizens State Bank and Holmes. The court did note, how-
ever, that the IRS summons probably was an infringement on the first amendment rights of the
Life Science Church. 636 F.2d at 224.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Trader's State Bank, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9131 (9th Cir. 1983) (ber cunam), refused to enforce an IRS summons for a church's bank
records. Citing Citizens State Bank, the court found the IRS had shown no rational connection
between the documents sought and a legitimate governmental end.
188. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
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